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·In the SUpreffie Court
of the State of Utah
COM~1ERCIAL

BANI{ OF UTAH,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-

No. 7636

STATE OF UTAH AND ROY W.
SIM~IONS as Bank C01nmissioner
for the State of Utah,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF

APPELL~T

STATE1IENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs brought this action in the district court
to recover certain sums paid by it under protest to the
defendant, bank commissioner of the State of Utah, under
the provisions of Sections 7-1-11, 7-1-11X, and 7-3-6, Utah
Code Annotated 1943, on the theory that these statutes,
under which such sums were assessed and collected, are
3
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unconstitutional as- ·being- in contravention of -Article
XIII, Sections 2, 3 and· 11, Article I, Section -24 and
Article VI, Section 23, of the Constitution of Utah. Defendants admitted the assessment and payment of the
sum in question, but denied the invalidity of the statutes.
A stipulation of facts was filed and testimony was taken
in the trial. The district court awarded judgment for
the plaintiff as was prayed and the defendants are here
on appeal frmn this judgment. The trial court ruled that
Article VI, Section 23, Utah Constitution, was not violated in the passage of the acts in question, and we therefore do not discuss that issue here.
The isssue of this case is the validity of the legislative arrangement for support of the banking department,
known as the "financial institutions' fund." This fund
consists of certain collections made from financial institutions under the supervision of the banking departlnent according to a graduated schedule based upon th2
aggregate assets of such institutions, as set forth in Section 7-1-11; Utah Code Annotated 1943. Under the provisions of Section 7-1-11X, Utah Code Annotated 1943,
these collections are paid by the bank commissioner into
the state treasurer and constitute a separate and distinct
fund known as the "financial institutions' fund." Biennially the legislature appropriates fron1 this fund to the
banking department for the cost of administration of
that departn1ent. (R. 8) The legislature has provided
that any sums in excess of $25,000.00 shall at the end of
each fiscal year revert from the financial institutions'
fund to the general fund of the State, Section 7-1-llX,
4
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Utah Code Annotated 1943. The record shows that only
one such transfer from the financial institutions' fund
to the general fund has in fact been made. ( R. 9, 13, 63)
The plaintiff banking corporation is a branch or
"chain" connnercial and savings bank system, organized
in 1948, consisting of a hon1e office, with branches located in Delta, Heber, Nephi, Payson, and Spanish Fork,
"Gtah. The hon1e office is located in Spanish Fork. (R.
8) The stipulation of facts states that, according to the
articles of incorporation, the home office at Spanish Fork
does not carry on active commercial or savings bank
activities, but serves merely as a central managerial control point for the operation of the five branches. (R. 7)
The entire banking system in the year 1949 carried aggregate assets in the amount of $11,828,949.16. (R. 8)
Under the provisions of Sections 7-3-6 and 7-1-11, Utah
Code Annotated 1943, the bank commissioner assessed
against the Commercial Bank of Utah fees under the
following schedule. (R. 11) :
Spanish Fork :Nlain Office ________ $11,828,949.16 $1,000.00
Spanish Fork Office --------------------$ 2, 707,645.69
270,764.57 $ 500.00
plus 10% -------------------------------$ 2,978,410.26
Delta Office------------------------------------$ 1,709,302.65
plus 10% -------------------------------170,930.27
$ 1,880,232.92 $ 400.00
Payson Office --------------------------------$ 1,783,016.83
plus 10% -------------------------------178,301.68 $ 400.00

$ 1,961,318.51
5
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Heber Or£ice-· -~~------~;_·_:; ____-____ :~---~----:"$ ·1,923,581. 7-6
plus 10% -------------------------------192,358.18

$ 2,115,939.94 $ 500.00
Nephi Office --------------------------------$ 2, 751,819.83
plus 10% -------------------------------275,181.99
$ 3,027,001.82 $ 650.00
$3,450.00
This schedule of fees was arrived at by the bank
commissioner under that portion of Section 7-3-6, Utah
Code Annotated 1943, which provides:
"The same requirements for examination of
branch banks shall apply as for any other banks
and the bank commissioner shall collect for the examination of each such branch bank the fee required
for the examination of any bank of like size and in
computing such fee the capital of such branch
shall be considered to be one-tenth of the total
liabilities carried at such branch; prov·ided, tlw.t
in no case shall the fee for the- examination of a
branch be less than $40. rrhis shall not in any wa~T
affect the amount of fees to be paid for an examination of the main office of any bank having
branches."
The actual computation of the fees is not in issue,
but rather the legality of the fees as thus computed.
A considerable portion of the testimony taken at the
trial was intended to show that the services rendered hy
the bank departn1ent in its examination and supervision
of the plaintiff does not bear a direct relationship to the
fees charged. The answer to this problem is given in the
6
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sixteenth paragraph of the Stipulation of Facts (R. 10),
which we quote:
.. That because of factors which vary fron1 exmnination to exmnination and institution to institution, there is not necessarily a correlation between the an10unt of the fee charged by the State
Bank Conunissioner for any particular year and
the work actually perfor1ned by the State Banking
Deparhnent in its examining and supervisory
capacity during the period. Some of these variable factors are: the gener~l econ01nic condition
of the area served by the institution; a comparison of the bank exa1nined with a bank of similar
size in other parts of the state and district ; comparison of examined banks with other banks of
following ratios: percent of total assets to cash
and balances with other banks, V. S. Government
assets, total capital accounts; percent of total
loans classified by the exmniner as being past
due, sub-standard, doubtful, or im1nediate loss;
the type, size and number of loans made (for example, less time is consu1ned in exan1ining where
there are·ten well secured loans of $10,000.00 each
than where there are 100 loans of $1,000.00 each
secured by a variety of collateral, each of which
must be separately analyzed); that the an1ounts
charged as fees are based on aggregate assets
as set forth in Sections 7-1-11 and 7-3-G, Utah
Code Annotated, 1943."
It was further stipulated that the exmnination of
the plaintiff, in the year 1949, was made in conjunction
with the examiners fr01n the Federal Reserve Syste1n
who did a portion of the work of. exmnining. ( R. 7) rrhe
record further shows that where a financial institution
7
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is -under·· the .. jurisdiction of ·.the bank coniinission, and
in addition thereto a member of the Federal Reserve
System, it is the general practice of the banking department to examine such institutions in collaboration with
the Federal Reserve examiners. (R. 28 ff.) The department further accepts and uses reports of examinations
by the Federal Deposits Insurance Corporation. (R. 30)
Prior to consolidation of the five banks into a branch
system, it was not necessary that the examination of
eaeh of these banks be conducted simultaneaously; however, because of th~ consolidation, good bank examining
practic~s require ~uch simultaneous examination. (R.
28) _Furthermore_, consolidation gave the plaintiff
marked advantages in the banking business. (R. 49)
The financial in~titution~ fund, as it existed at the
time this case was brought, was creat.~cl. in .1933 and is
found in the statut~ now known as Section 7-1-11X:, Utah
Cod~ 1\:r;t;notated 1943. We quote that section:
"All fees accruing to the banking department
as hereinbefore provided in this act shall be pairl
by the bank cominissioner into the state treasurer
monthly, and shall constitute 11 separate and distinct fund which shall be known as the financial
institutions fund. All expenses incurred and all
compensation paid by the department in the administration of this act shall be paid out of the
financial institutions fund upon order of the
·conimission on vouchers approved by the state
auditor. No part of such fund shall revert to the
general fu;nd of the state ~t the close of any fiscal
year until such fund shall mnount to $25,000 in
which event any amount in .such fund in excess
8
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of $25,000 shall revert to the general-fund at .the
end of each fiscal year."
The record shows that this fund remained below the
$25,000.00 maximuin until the inflationary period following "\Y orld "\Y ar II. ( R. 13) It also shows that under the
reverting clause of the statute cited above,_ only one
transfer has been made from that fund to the general
fund of the State. (R. 9) At the same time the record
shows that the banking department, because of the failure
on the part of the legislature to appropriate sufficient
sums to it fr01n that fund, has not been able to carry
out fully the duties imposed upon it by the law. ·(R. 14,
29-30)
As stated earlier, the issue of this case is the constitutionality of those statutes establishing the. fees of
the financial institutions under the supervi_sion of. the
banking department and creating the financial institutions fund. Plaintiff alleged .in its ~omplaint that th~
fees charged it under those statutes for the year 1949
were illegally and unlawfully assessed· because those
statutes, Sections 7-1-10, 7-1-11, 7-1-11X, and 7-3-6, Utah
Code Annotated 1943, are unconstitutional ~n that they
violate Article XIII, Sections 2, 3,· and 11, Article 1,
Section 24~ and Article VI, Section 23, Utah Constitution.
As stated earlier, the trial court foi.tnd no vi.ol~tion of
Article VI, Section 23. The t~eory. upon which· ~his unconstitutionality is alleged is that these fees are in fact
an ad valoren1 or direct property tax, duplicitous in
nature. Defendants denied this ·allegatio~ on the theory
that the ,legislature has the authorityto ~s-tablish and pro.,.
·~
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vide·· for the eolleeti:on of these fees· under Article· XIII,
Section 1~, of the Utah Co-nstitution, which states~·
"Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to prevent the Legislature from providing
a stamp tax, or a tax based on income, occupation, licenses, or franchises."
The trial court, after making its findings of fact, entered the following conclusions of law. (R. 62):
(1) That the sum of $3,450.00 was illegally
and unlawfully assessed and collected by the defendant from the plaintiff.

(2) That Sections 7-1-11 and 7-3-6, Utah
Code Annotated 1943, are in contravention of
Article XIII, Sections 2, 3, and 11 and Article I,
Section 24 of the Constitution of Utah..
( 3) That said Sections 7-1-11 and 7-3-6 do
not prescribe or establish a valid occupation, license or franchise tax under the provisions of
-Article XIII, Section 12 of the Constitution of
Utah.
(4) That Sections 7-1-11 and 7-3-6, Utah
Code Annotated 1943, do not establish a valid
regulatory or licence tax or fee.
(5) That the plaintiff should have judgment
against the defendants in the amount of $3,450.00
and for its costs.

and thereupon entered its judgment accordingly.
The issues before this court appear, therefore,
to be:
10
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(1) \\1lether the charges against financial insti..
tutions under the supervision of the banking depl\rt~
ment, established by Sections 7-1-11 and 7-3-6, Utah Code
Annotated 1943, are in fact ad valore1n or property taxes,
or exci8es in the for1n of occupation or license fees and,

(2) if the latter, whether the charges. made against
the plaintiff banking corporation under those statutes
are so unreasonable as to render those statutes void.

STATE~IENT

OF POINTS

I.
CHARGES l\IADE AGAINST FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE BANKING
DEPARTMENT, PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 7-1-11 and 7-3-6, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1943,
DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN AD VALOREM OR PROPERTY
TAX, BUT RATHER, ARE AN OCCUPATION OR LICENSE
FEE, SO THAT THEY COME WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF
ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 12, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

II.
THE FEES ESTABLISHED FOR 'FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF. J'JtE BANKING
DEPARTMENT DO NOT VIOLATE ''rilE' UNIF~ORMITY OF
OPERATION OF LAWS REQUIREMENT OF :THE CONS1'1TUTION.
,·~ ·

III.
THE DIFFERENCE , IN FE~S- ~CHA~GED ., JH~AiN,CH
BANKING SYSTEMS, AS OPPOSED TO NON BRANCH
BANKS, UNDER SECTION 7-3-6, UTAH .CODE ANNOTATED
1943, DOES NOT RENDER THAT SECTION VOID.

11
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. ·. .: ARGUMENT-~-.
I._ .
CHARGES MADE AGAINST FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS UNDER THE •· SUPERVISION OF T.HE BANKING
DEPARTMENT, PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 7-1-11 and 7.. 3-6, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1943,
DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN AD VALOREM OR PROPERTY
TAX, BUT RATHER, ARE AN OCCUPATION OR LICENSE
FEE, SO THAT THEY COME WITHIN THE PROVJSIONS OF
ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 12, OF THE UTAH CONSTITU'l'IQN.

We recognize the rule that, whether a charge made
by the State is a direct property tax or an excise, franchise, occupation or license· tax, depends upon the incidents of the particular tax or fee, and not upon what
the legislature 6r anyone else calls it. However, it is
our position that the fees charged plaintiff under Sections 7-1-11 and 7~3-6, Utah Code Annotated 1943, are
not, because of their very incidents, subject to the provisions of Article XIII, Sections 2, 3, and 11, Utah Constitution. Those sections, so far as material here, provide:
Art. XIII, 2 : "All tangible property in the
State, not exempt under the laws of the United
States, or under this constitution, shall be taxed
in proportion to its value, to be ascertained a:5
provided by law. * * *"
Art. XIII, 3: "The Legislature shall provide
by law a uniform and equal rate of assessment and
taxation on all tangible property- in the State,
according to its value in rnoney, and shall prescribe by: law such regulations as shall secure a
just valuation for taxation of such property, so
12
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.: that ·every person and co-rporatio~ shall pay a tax
in proportion to the value of his, her, 9:t its tangible property; •. * * Intangible property may be
exempted from taxation as property or it may be
taxed in such a manner and to such extent as the
Legislature may provide. Provided that if intangible property be taxed as property the rate
thereof shall not exceed five mills on each dollar
of valuation. When exempted from taxation as
property, the taxable- income therefrmn shall he
taxed under any tax based on incomes, but when
taxed by the State of Utah as property, the income
therefrom shall not also be taxed. * * .,
Art. XIII, 11: "***The State Tax Commission shall administer and supervise the tax laws
of the State** *."
Art. I, 24: "All laws of a general nature
shall have uniform operation.,
Article XIII, Section 12, -provides :
"Nothing in this Constitution shall be con:strued to prevent the Legislature from providing
a stamp tax, or a tax based on income, occupation, licenses or franchises."
In construing this last cited section· of the Utah Constitution, this court, in the case of Salt Lake City v. Christensen Co., 34 Utah 38, 42, 95 Pac. 523, 17 LRA (NS) 898,
(1909) stated:
"By adopting [Article XIIIJ se_ction 12, as we
view it, the framers of the Constitution neither
intended to, nor did they, in any way place a limitation upon the power of the LegislatureJo irnpose
the several kinds of taxes specified in that section .
.Out of abundance_ of caution,. however, the ~ramers
-U
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of the Constitution said that nothing therein
should be construed as to prevent the Legislature
from impo·sing and enforcing the said taxes.
"Having thus eliminated from the 'Constitution altogether the several kinds of taxes specified in section 12, it is reasonable to suppose that
''the framers of that instrument nevertheless intended to provide for the conditions upon which
such taxes should b,e imposed by a reference to
· other parts of the same instrument~ The framers
of- the Constitution imposed certain duties, and
with them certain specified restrictions, upon the
Legislature, but in section 12 neither duties nor
restrictions of any kind are mentioned. All that
was intended, and all that was there said, was that
. D{)thing that had been said on the subject of taxation should be construed so as to in any way
curtail .the,. power of the Legislature with regard
to license or occupation taxes. In other words,
, the-framers of the Constitution desired to impress
upon alLthat no restriction upon the Legislature
should be implied from what had been before
written in that instrument upon the special sub. ject of taxation referred to in section 12. "\Ve are
of the opinion, therefore, that the right to impose
occupation and license taxes and other subjects
of taxation mentioned in section 12 was left, and
clearly intended to be left, where it always was,
namely, with the Legislature, to be applied and
controlled as to it might seem just and proper."

·:CQ~lcerning. the objection that the ordinance under consideration violated the equality and uniformity of laws
provision of the· Constitution, this court went on to say:
-~ _;,

"Independently of the constitutional excep.. tion above discussed, the courts have frequently

14
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· passed upon and applied the general constitutional
provision demanding equality and uniformity of
'·taxation. The decisions are almost, if not quite,
unanimous that the constitutional provision which
hnposes equality and uniformity of taxation has
no application to an occupation or license tax, but
is limited to a direct property tax which is assessed and collected in the usual way."
The distinction between a property tax and the
several kinds of excises mentioned in Artic~e XIII, Section 12, Utah Constitution, is discussed in an annotation,
103 ALR 18, entitled 'iWhat is a Property Tax as Distinguished from Excise, License, and Other Taxes." As
pointed out therein, definitions are not much help, and
resort is usually made to the incidents of the tax or
charge. The annotation contains excerpts from two cases,
Re Skelton Lead & Zinc Co.'s Gross Production Tax,
(1921) 81 Okla. 134, 197 Pac. 495, and Reif v. Barrett
( 1933) 355 Ill. 104, 188 NE 889, which set forth the distinctive incidents of the two types of taxes or charges
so well that we quote therefrom:
"The mission of a license tax, occupation tax,
or privilege tax, or by whatever name this species
of tax may be called, is always to regulate a
given business, or control the right to engage in
a given occupation. It is imposed as a condition
or as an element of the conditions upon the right
to exercise a given privilege, its primary mission
being to regulate and control; and while the tax
itself may not always be the sole condition, yet its
payment is invariably made a part or a factor
in the conditions upon which a business may be
15
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conducted, by the statute under which such tax
is levied. • • •
·
"The basis of an occupation tax lies in the
police power to regulate, but the basis of a property tax is inherent in. the. very fact of govern. mental protection of property. The fact that the
proceeds of an 'occupation tax' may constitute
a portion or the sole source of revenue does not
change its mission, nor make it any the less an
occupation tax. Nor does the fact that an occupation tax is levied upon an ad valorem basis render
it any the less an occupation tax. This method
is quite frequently adopted, and in some cases
might be the most just and reasonable measure
for such a tax. Both kinds of taxes may be levied
upon the same property, and both be levied upon
an ad valorem basis, and both be valid. • • •
"As to "\Vhether or not a given tax is an excise,
. or a privilege and occupational, or a property· tax,
is ordinarily not difficult of solution. They are
- essentially different types of tax, with no infringement or overlapping of one upon the other.. Their
character and their objects are vastly different.
A property tax is levied merely for the purpose of
raising revenue, and is levied against property.
It does not seek or in an wise attempt to control
the use, operation, or regulation of the property.
When the tax is raised, the n1ission of the property tax has been fulfilled. A property tax has
, nothing whatever to do with the question of privi. Jege, license, or pennission. On the other hand,
an occupation tax has one of two missions: Either
to regulate and control a given business or occupation, or to impose a tax for the privilege of
exercising, undertaking, or operating a given occupation, trade, or profession. Its effect is to license
16
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. a. person engaged: in_ a given railing_ or. occupation. A license in fOI:H1 may not be issued to a taxpayer, but the payment of the tax is the license
under the authority of ·the state to engage in such
occupation. Regulation is not a necessary adjunc.t
of an occupation tax. It Inay or it may not be. The
paynlent of the tax itself is a condition precedent
to the privilege of carrying en a business or occupation. The payment of the tax is made mandatory, by the act creating it, upon the right of the
individual to follow the given .uccupation. An occupation tax may be levied under the general
police powers of the state, where its purpose is
to regulate or control a given -ee.cup.atioll, or it
may be levied under the general sovereign power
of the state, where its sole purpose is to raise
revenue. Under which power it is levied makes no
difference as to the character of the tax.''
The rule is stated thus in 33 American Jurisprudence, p. 326, § 3, "Licenses" :
"In the 1nain, the distinction between a property tax and a license or privilege tax imposed.
for revenue is that the function of the property
tax is to raise revenue by virtue of the fact that
the property is within the jurisdiction of the
taxing power, and no condition or restriction is
imposed thereby upon the use of the property
taxed, while the license or privilege tax, even
though also passed to raise revenue, is imposed
upon the right to exercise a privilege, and its
payment is made a condition to the exercise, or
continuance in the exercise, of the privilege, business, or vocation involved. Altho-qgh a property
tax may constitute a burden upon a business to
the extent of the tax, a license or occupation tax
17
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may, if not paid, and with its,-ancillary provi~ions,
bring to an end the business altogether."
Through Title 7, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as
amended, the Legislature has undertaken to supervise
and regulate the banking business in this state. r_ro pay
the costs of this service, it has established the financial
institutions fund, consisting of fees paid by institutions
under the supervision of the banking department which,
for purposes of this case are based on aggregate assets
of the institutions. The statutes dealing with this fund,
Sections 7-1-11, 7-1-11X, and 7-3~6, Utah Code Annotated,
' are an integral part of the banking code, and, while there
is no express provision that the bank commissioner may
revoke approval of a bank's right to do business for nonpayment of such fees, we believe such authority may be
inferred. Section 7-1-11, Utah Code Annotated 1943,
provides:
"All financial institutions under the supervision of the state banking department of the
state of Utah shall pay to the bank commissioner
of the state of Utah the fees for the cost of supervision and exan1ination according to the following schedule * * *."
There is no right in anyone to engage in the banking
business; rather, there is merely a privilege or franchise,
which may be granted by the legislature on its terms.
Pue et al. v. Hood, Commissioner of Banks, et al., 22
SE 2d 896, 222 N. C. 310 (1942), and Engel v. O'Malley,
et al., (1911) 219 U. S. 128, 31 S. Ct. 190, 55 L. Ed. 12R.
The Utah Legislature has seen fit to regulate and restrict
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the busine.ss·.of
bankiiJ.g ,in thi_s §ta_t~, ·. perriiitt~ng.it
,.
.
. . . . . ·- .. only
on certain tenus, one of which is the payment~ of the fees
for operation of the banl{ing department as set forth in
Section 7-1-11 and 7-3-6, Utah Code Annotated 1943. We
believe, therefore, that the fees are an excise in the
nature of a license or occupation tax, that these fees
are governed by the provisions of Article XIII, Section
12, Utah Constitution, and that the other provisions of
that Article do not apply. Salt Lake City v. Christensen
Co., supra.
.

II.
THE FEES ESTABLISHED FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE BANKING
DEPARTMENT DO NOT VIOLATE THE UNIFORMITY OF
OPERATION OF LAWS REQUIRErviENT OF THE CONSTITUTION.

One of the allegations of plaintiff's complaint which
defendants denied was that the fees established by Sections 7-1-11 and 7-3-6, Utah Code Annotated 1943, were
illegal in that those statutes violated Article I, Section
24, of the Utah Constitution. That section states:
"All laws of a general naure shall have uniform operation."
This court, in the case of Untermeyer et al. v. State
Tax Cmnmission et al., (1942) 102 Utah 214, 223, 129 P
2d 881, considered this constitutional provision as it
applied to the estate tax statutes of this State. It was
therein stated that:
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"As appli&d to taxation statutes such constitutional provision requires only that the tax shall
falf equally upon all similarly situated."
The case of Salt Lake City v. Christensen Co.,
supra, considered the validity of a graduated license
tax upon certain retail businesses adopted by Salt Lake
City pursuant to a delegation of power by the legislature. The fee there fixed was based upon the cash
value of goods and merchandise in the possession of the
respective merchants, and the capital employed by bankers and brokers, the fees rising in amount as these figures
mounted. To the objection that the ordinance violated
the uniformity of laws rule, this court stated:
"The authorities, therefore, are against the
contention of appellant that such a classification
offends against uniformity. The provision is not
that the taxes must be equal as between individuals, but that they 'shall be uniform in respect
to the class upon which they are imposed.' If a
flat rate upon all merchants alike is uniform tax
within the provision, why is one where greater
equalization is effected by classifying the merchants into groups, so as to bring those with
stocks the value of which are more nearly alike,
not also uniform? The classification is for the
sole purpose of establishing equality, so far as
this can be done."
The fees established by Sections 7-1-11 and 7-3-6,
Utah Code Annotated 1943, graduated upon the basis
of aggregate assets, "fall equally upon all similarly
situated." They are uniform as respects t~e elass upon
20
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which they are i1nposed, and therefor.e,-.. do. not. violate.
Article I, Section :2-t, Utah Constitution.

III.
THE DIFFERENCE IN FEES CHARGED BRANCH
BANKING SYSTEMS, AS OPPOSED TO NON BRANCH
BANKS, UNDER SECTION 7-6-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
1943, DOES NOT RENDER THAT SECTION VOID.

At the trial evidence was adduced showing that,
while plaintiff corporation, with aggregate assets in
1949 of $11,8:28,9-19.1G, paid a total sum to the bank
conunissioner as fees under Section 7-3-6, Utah Code
Annotated 19-13, of $3,400.00, a bank in Salt Lake City,
not then a hranch syste1n, with aggregate assets of
approxjmately $80,000,000.00, paid a fee under Section
7-1~11, Utah Code Annotated 1943, of only $1,500.00
(R. 3S-39). \V e presume this was offered on the theory
that it showed an unreasonable charge upon plaintiff
as against that n1ade upon other banks under the jurisdiction of the banking department.
It n1ust be remembered that plaintiff 1s a branch
or "chain" bank system. It 1nust further be reme1nbered
that there is no right to engage in the banking business,
but meu~ly a priYilege or franchise which may be granted
by the legislature on its tenns. Pue et al. v. Hood, et al.,
supra, and Engel v. 0'111 alley et al., supra. Furthermore,
branch banking may be prohibited entirely, or permitted
on such terms as t11e legislature dee1ns fit, so long as
they are reasonable and uniform. Bank of Italy Ll.
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J o"-n~on, 25l.: ·Pac: 784, 200 Cal 1 · (1927) ; 1 Mie.hie,.
Banks and· Banking 100.
We respectfully submit that fees· provided· by Section 7-3-6, Utah Code Annotated 1943, are uniform as
regards all banks similarly situated to plaintiff, and, in
view of the advantages enjoyed by a branch system, and
the differences in the work of the bank department in
supervising and examining a branch srstem, such fees
are not unreasonable. Furthermore, we respectfully
submit that branch banking is a valid classification for
puropses of fixing such fees, and that the fees thus
arrived at are not so unmistakably arbitrary or capricious and unjust that the statute must fail. True, a
branch system may pay a larger total fee than a nonbranch banking corporation, but we submit that neither
the classification nor the amount of the fee is unreasonable.

CONCLUSION
The trial court has ruled that the fees established
by Section 7-1-11, Utah Code Annotated 1943, which
constitute the financial institutions fund of this state,
are void because they are in effect a direct property tax,
and thus contravene Article XIII, Sections 2, 3, and 11,
and Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution of this State.
It further ruled that that section and Section 7-3-6, Utah
Code Annotated 1943, which adapts Section 7-1-11 to a
branch banking system, do not establish a valid license,
22
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ooou~tion,

-or .o.ther ·form of ~Gise t~ _:such as would
bring such fees within the provisions- :oi. Arti~le ·xrii,_·
Section 12, Utah Constitution. With this ~~~ciu~io~ ~e
respectfully dlffer .. 'Vhen these·: sections. are v1ew~-d in
connection with the entire banking act, it· can be seen
that these fees possess certain incidents which put them
within the classification of an excise in the nature of an
occupation or license tax, within the meaning of Article
XIII, Section 12 of the Constitution, and remove therri
from the provisions of that instrument which it is claimed
are viola ted.
The legislature has seen fit to permit branch banking in this state under certain conditions as set forth
in Section 7-3-6, Utah Code Annotated 1943. Among
those conditions is that a branch system shall pay an
annual fee, computed upon aggregate assets on a graduated scale for assets carried at each such branch, plus
a fee computed in the same manner upon the aggregate
assets of the entire financial institution. This, we submit,
the legislature has the power to do. As stated by this
court in the case of Garrett Freight Lines v. State Tax
Commission, (1943) 103 Utah 390, 135 P 2d 523.
"In i1nposing a tax upon some particular
class or group of persons, the Legislature should
not act arbitrarily and without consideration
of ability to pay or benefits of government received. But unless the classification adopted by
the Legislature is clearly and unmistakably arbitrary or capricious, and unjust, the enactlnent
must be upheld. The power of. t~e courts under
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the Constitution is not a veto power. With the
wisdom of legislative policy the courts are not
concerned."
We submit that the fees charged plaintiff by the
bank commissioner under the provisions of Section 7-3-6,
Utah Code Annotated 1943, were neither arbitrary nor
capricious, but were based upon a classification that the
legislature had the power to make, and, in view of the
privileges granted plaintiff by the State, they are not
unreasonable.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINTON D. VERNON
Attorney General
ALLEN B. SORENSEN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellants.
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